Peter Altmaier

The chief of staff Altmaier (CDU) was extensively involved in every part of migration policy. Together with Merkel, the suspect engaged in the policy-making process of migration policies in a top-down approach which makes him responsible for the decisions taken by the German government on the matters. (See Germany Report, General Overview). Since the  German government was reported to refuse the europeanization of MN, the suspect in his role as Chief of Staff, was involved in refusing Italian Prime Minister Renzi’s request for aid from the EU for MN. Further, the suspect did not pursue an offer to step in for Italy and take in rescued migrants from a potential Mare Nostrum-style EU mission. (See Germany Report, 2014 – Mare Nostrum)

In June 2015, the suspect with the German government decided to contribute two boats to Operation Triton. (See Germany Report, 2015 – Triton)

Germany’s position, in which the suspect  was involved in his function as chief of staff, was to call for anincluded the call for an expansion of Sophia’s mandate at the Foreign Ministers Council meeting on 18 April 2016 (See Germany Report,2016 – Operation Sophia).

The aim of the suspect and other German officials was to tackle as many aspects of migration as possible at once to limit the number of refugees reaching Germany in an attempt to combine the several external migration policy objectives. Germany’s position was heavily driven by the domestic situation and public opinion, this “comprehensive policy” position enabled the suspect and German politicians to simultaneously claim it was prioritizing saving lives while also limiting migration (See Germany Report, 2015 – Triton).

As Merkel’s chief of staff, the suspect was strongly involved and coordinated the German position on migration with the chancellor in a top-down policy-making approach in which they would actively instruct the relevant units within the government on migration policy. A change of policy direction occured with increasing numbers of refugees’ arrivals and caused internal change of structures such as in October 2015 Merkel and the suspect  created the refugee policy unit (RPU) (See Germany Report, General Overview). Germany’s principle objectives in the Mediterranean were to stop migrants from leaving Libya as part of an overall strategy and to externalize ‘migration control’ to African countries. Further, the German government was in favor of the training and funding of the Libyan coastguard and provided funding for the operation. The German government and the suspect as part of it, initiated the Valletta summit in 2015 with the outcome of an extensive externalisation of ‘migration control’ to Libyan authorities, while together with Merkel, the suspect was aware of the human rights situation in Libya at all times and were reported to  discuss the human rights situation in Libya in the context of training the Libyan coastguard. Explicitely, the Office of the Chancellor received a diplomatic cable from the German Embassy in Niger in February 2017, describing the Libyan detention facilities as a place with “concentration camp-like conditions” which was not a new information given the country visits of high level German officials to Libya. (See Germany Report, 2017 – Involvement in the training & funding of the Libyan coastguard)

German government was in favor of the training and funding of the Libyan coastguard and provided funding for the operation. Germany provided training personnel and material for the first phase of the Libyan coastguard training for the first time in 2018 while the suspect was aware of the dire conditions in Libyan detention centres at all stages. Further, the training of the Libyan coastguard was funded by the German government, presumably through contributions to the EUTF (See Germany Report, 2017 – Involvement in the training & funding of the Libyan coastguard).