Mark Rutte

Since 14 October 2010, the suspect has been the Prime Minister of the Netherlands and he acts as the head of the Cabinet, of the Council of Ministers and of the Cabinet Committees. The Advisory Committee for Migration Affairs is the Cabinet Committee relevant to migration policies. The suspect has been holding great power in aforementioned different bodies through agenda-setting, chairing of the meetings and monitoring of the implementation of policies in the Dutch government. (See Netherlands Report, General Overview).

Functional responsibility for the decisions of the European Council from 2010 to present.

This includes:

• the Council's decision in the summer of 2014 not to "europeanize" Mare Nostrum and its tacit agreement with the establishment of Triton (See: European Council report: 2014: Mare Nostrum).

• the Council conclusions in March 2015, which called for “strengthening Triton" (See European Council Report, 2015 - Operation Triton).

• the Council conclusions in April 2015, which increased funds for Operations Triton and Poseidon without meaningfully expanding the operation’s search and rescue activities (See European Council Report, 2015 - Operation Triton).

The suspect, when the Netherlands assumed the Presidency of the Council of the EU oversaw the decision to extend the mandate of Sophia to include capacity building and training of Libyan coastguards in June 2016. (See Netherlands Report, Presidency).

A German government source reported that the Dutch Presidency led a powerful Presidency and was agenda-setting on migration issues (See Council of the EU, Dutch Presidency).

Functional responsibility for the decisions of the European Council from 2010 to present.

This includes:

• the Council conclusions in April 2015, which aksed the Commission to lay the groundwork for an anti-smuggling operation, which would become Operation Sophia (See European Council Report, 2015 - Operation Triton).

Functional responsibility for the repeated efforts of the European Council from 2010 to present to rhetorically marginalize refugees.

This includes:

• efforts to frame the refugee crisis not as a humanitarian issue but as a matter of border control. E.g., the December 2015 Council conclusions stressed the need to “regain control over the external borders. (See European Council Report, 2015 - Valletta Summit). Likewise, in February 2016, the Council emphasized its dissatisfaction with the “slow” pace of regaining control of external borders and highlighted the “necessity” to act swiftly on limiting migration. (See European Council Report, 2016). In addition, the Bratislava Declaration of September 2016 reiterated the need to “ensure full control of external borders” (See European Council Report, 2016)

• efforts to frame the refugee crisis as a matter of "illegal migration," a phrase used repeatedly, e.g. in the Council conclusions of October 2017 and June 2018 (See European Council Report: 2017: The Libyan Coastguards; European Council Report: 2018)

The suspect as the Prime Minister of the Netherlands is ultimatively repsonsible for raising the technical requirements for rescue NGO ships to a degree under which a number of rescue NGOs could no longer operate. By doing so, Netherlands opened the way to what would soon become a widely shared policy over the continent: the inhibition of NGOs actions in the Mediterranean at all costs. (See Netherlands Report, NGO Criminalization).

In May 2016, during its Presidency, the suspect’s Foreign Minister Bert Koenders paid a visit to Tripoli where he met with Libyan Prime Minister Al-Sarraj and the Libyan coastguard. With the latter he “joint action to tackle people smuggling and [migration management]. (See Netherlands Report, Presidency).

A month later, the Netherlands and International Organization for Migration Libya (IOM Libya) concluded an agreement “for an 18-month project aimed at enhancing the Libyan coastguard’s capacity to save lives at sea.” This project was provided with a budget of 1.5 million euros and would further equip the coastguard with equipment and technical means. Given that June 2016 marked the official mandate expansion of Operation Sophia to include the training of the Libyan coastguard, it is reasonable to assume that the Netherlands played an active role in this evolution. (See Netherlands Report, Presidency of the Council of the EU (January – June 2016).

The suspect, when the Netherlands assumed the Presidency of the Council of the EU oversaw the decision to extend the mandate of Sophia to include capacity building and training of Libyan coastguards in June 2016. (See Netherlands Report, Presidency).

Functional responsibility for the decisions of the European Council from 2010 until present:

This includes:

• November 2015 Action Plan decided at the Valletta Summit, which launched the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa to assist with “migration management projects"" and thus created a financial tool for the future trainig of the LYCG (See European Council Report, 2015 - Valletta Summit).

Functional responsibility for the decisions of the European Council 2010 to present.

This includes:

• November 2015 Action Plan decided at the Valletta Summit, which laid the groundwork for sharing maritime surveillance data with Libya. (See European Council Report, 2015 - Valletta Summit)

Functional responsibility for the decisions of the European Council

This includes:

• November 2015 Action Plan decided at the Valletta Summit, which laid the groundwork for sharing maritime surveillance data with Libya. (See European Council Report, 2015 - Valletta Summit)