Fabrice Leggeri

On May 26th 2015, the suspect signed the amended operation plan of the Joint Operation Triton significantly expanding Triton’s powers however far from reaching the MN level on SAR operations. (See, Frontex, B policies and Implication, II End of MN/ Start of JO Triton, a policy development)

The suspect recommended (under JO Triton to expand air surveillance to the Maltese Waters instead of increasing means of SAR directly on the waters (See, Frontex, B Policies and Implications, II End of MN start of JO Triton, b public statements)

The suspect tried to appoint member's of Frontex Management Board as Fundamental Right Officer; he justified it regarding their level of expertise but it was only to strengthen his own position (See, Fronte, B Policies and implication, III Lack of transparency)

The suspect evaluates the suscess of migration  policies according to the decrease of people arriving in Europe; when he talks about migration (in public statements) he uses the expression "economic migrants"

The suspect accused NGOs in front of the Italian Senate Commission. In February 2017, he gave interviews accusing NGOs of constituting a pull factor and refusing of collaborating with law enforcement agencies in their fight against smuggling and trafficking. (See, Frontex, B Policies and implications, IV Criminalizing NGOs).

The suspect (and Körner) invited the LYCG to a European Patrol Network meeting in 2016 "in order to continue our cooperation" (See, Frontex, B Policies and implication, VI Collaboration with Libya and LYCG, c Seahorse Network).Lybia officially thanked Leggei for the professionalism showed by his team "during the training period on board ITS San Giorgio" from 4 to 21 December 2016 under EUNAVFOR MED. In 2017 Leggeri stated in an interview with the German newspaper Die Welt, that Frontex was training future LYCG and that he excpetcted the agency to go further. (See, Frontex, B Policies and Implication, VI Collaboration with Lybia and LYCG). - In a letter of Berndt Körner to the Head of the Naval Coast Guard of Libya he is expressing his appreciation of the Libyan Coast Guards and inviting them to the launch of the EU coast guard cooperation network in 2016 to further strengthen their collaboration.

The suspect represented Frontex at the international meeting (10 October 2017) related to "Lybian MRCC Project" (See, Frontex, B Policies and implications, VI Collaboration with Lybia and LYCG, b Establishment of the MRCC "Tripoli").  According to a leaked letter by f DG Home at the European Commission, Fabrice Leggeri, on 18 March 2019, considered that it would be lawful for the operational plan of the Frontex Themis operation to include procedures for notifying sightings of boats in “distress” at sea to the Libyan Coast Guard, including data on vessel monitoring and detection through satellite technology that is part of the EUROSUR; he also acknowledged that the aerial assets of the EUNAVFOR MED Sophia operation had shared similar information with the Libyan authorities. 

The suspect signed a Service Level Agreement in which EMSA agreed to the provision of surveillance tools and services in support of Frontex activities, including for the implementation of the EUROSUR framework. (See, Frontex, B Policies and implication, VI Collaboration with Libya and LYCG, d MAS)