Angela Merkel

Merkel is reported to have been extensively and personally involved in almost every aspect of German and EU migration policy and to have had a detailed knowledge of the relevant issues and policies. Together with her Chief of Staff Altmeier, Merkel took a top-down approach to developing Germany's migration policies that gradually concentrated decision-making powers on migration matters, including the EU dimension, in the Chancellery (as opposed to the ministries) and above all in the hands of Merkel and Altmeier (See Germany Report) At the EU level, moreover, sources indicated that "the most influential actors on migration issues in the European Union during the 2010’s decade were Merkel and the French Presidents, Hollande and Macron" and that "nothing was decided without them: one had to get either France or Germany’s support to reach an agreement." (France report: Internal involvement in EU migration policy; Germany report C.)

This includes the German government's position that it would not take in rescued exiles from a potential Mare Nostrum-style EU mission and its reported refusal of Matteo Renzi’s request for aid to support the current existing mission (See Germany Report, B.I.). The German government was also actively involved in pushing for Operation Triton (See Germany report C.I.)

After the shipwrecks of April 2015, Merkel initiated a meeting of European heads of state aimed at increasing the resources allocated to Triton. (France Report: Launching of Operation Triton)

Merkel also has functional responsibility for the decisions of the European Council on Mare Nostrum and Triton.

This includes:

• the Council conclusions in March 2015, which called for “strengthening Triton" (See European Council Report, 2015 – Operation Triton).

• the Council conclusions in April 2015, which increased funds for Operations Triton and Poseidon without meaningfully expanding the operation’s search and rescue activities (See European Council Report, 2015 – Operation Triton).

Functional responsibility for the decisions of the European Council from 12/2014 to present.

This includes:

• the Council conclusions in April 2015, which asked the Commission to lay the groundwork for an anti-smuggling operation, which would become Operation Sophia (See European Council Report, 2015 – Operation Triton).

Functional responsibility for the repeated efforts of the European Council to rhetorically marginalize refugees.

This includes:

• efforts to frame the refugee crisis not as a humanitarian issue but as a matter of border control. E.g., the December 2015 Council conclusions stressed the need to “regain control over the external borders. (See European Council Report, 2015 – Valletta Summit). Likewise, in February 2016, the Council emphasized its dissatisfaction with the “slow” pace of regaining control of external borders and highlighted the “necessity” to act swiftly on limiting migration. (See European Council Report, 2016). In addition, the Bratislava Declaration of September 2016 reiterated the need to “ensure full control of external borders” (See European Council Report, 2016)

• efforts to frame the refugee crisis as a matter of “illegal migration,” a phrase used repeatedly, e.g. in the Council conclusions of October 2017 and June 2018 (See European Council Report: 2017: The Libyan Coastguards; European Council Report: 2018)

Under Merkel's watch, the German transport ministry's BG Verkehr agency changed its rules in a way that seemed designed to impose additional burdens on German-flagged NGO rescue vessels.

From late 2015 onwards, one of the central German policy pillars to limit migration inflows across the central Mediterranean was to externalize the problem to Africa. Merkel initiated the Valletta Summit in November 2015 to discuss this goal, leading to a cooperation agreement on migration with several African states and to the establishment of the EUTF, which created a financial tool for the future trainimg of the LYCG (See European Council Report, 2015 – Valletta Summit; Germany report B.II.; EUTF report – The Valletta Summit – creation of the EUTF).

Merkel also signaled her approval of Italian bilateral cooperation with Libyan authorities. Ahead of the 2017 Malta Summit, for instance, Merkel (along with Hollande, Tusk) “agreed on the need to support Italy in this cooperation [with Libya]. Especially the Memorandum of Understanding. Europe should and will stand by Italy.”

Merkel pushed for cooperation with Libya despite detailed knowledge of the poor humanitarian and human rights situation in the country. Ahead of the Malta summit, the Office of the Chancellor received a diplomatic cable from the German Embassy in Niger in February 2017, describing the “concentration camp-like conditions" inside Libyan detention facilities (Germany report B.IV.). Merkel also personally visited IOM reception centers in Niger and spoke with exiles that had returned from Libya. (Germany report C.IV.).

Merkel also bears functional responsibility for the decisions of the European Council for the relevant period.
This includes:

• November 2015 Action Plan decided at the Valletta Summit, which launched the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa to assist with “migration management projects“ and thus created a financial tool for the future trainig of the LYCG (See European Council Report, 2015 – Valletta Summit).

• the June 2016 Council conclusions, which expressed its approval of Operation Sophia's involvement in “training the Libyan coastguard. (See European Council Report, 2016)

• the December 2016 Council conclusions, which emphasized the goal of supporting the Libyan coastguard through Operation Sophia (See European Council Report, 2016)

• the 2017 Malta conference, at which Council members called for EU to “train, equip and support the Libyan national coast guard” (See European Council Report: 2017: The Libyan Coastguards)

• the June 2018 conclusions, which called on “all vessels... not [to] obstruct operations of the Libyan coastguard.” (See European Council Report: 2018)

German government was in favor of the training and funding of the Libyan coastguard and provided funding for the operation. Germany provided training personnel and material for the first phase of the Libyan coastguard training for the first time in 2018 while the suspect was aware of the dire conditions in Libyan detention centres at all stages. Further, the training of the Libyan coastguard was funded by the German government, presumably through contributions to the EUTF (See Germany Report, C.IV.).

In June 2015, the German government decided to contribute two boats to Operation Triton. (See Germany Report, C.II.)